Truth and Truthmakers

Cover......Page 1
Half-title......Page 3
Series-title......Page 4
Title......Page 5
Copyright......Page 6
Dedication......Page 7
Contents......Page 9
Preface......Page 13
1 An introduction to truthmakers......Page 15
2.2. HISTORICAL......Page 18
2.3. THE TRUTHMAKING RELATION......Page 19
2.3.1. Supervenience......Page 21
2.4. FALSEMAKERS......Page 23
2.5. THE ENTAILMENT PRINCIPLE......Page 24
2.6. TRUTHS AND FALSEHOODS ARE PROPOSITIONS......Page 26
2.7. CONNECTING TRUTH WITH REALITY......Page 30
2.9. TRUTHMAKERS FOR P MAY (PROPERLY) INCLUDE TRUTHMAKERS FOR P......Page 31
2.10. MINIMAL TRUTHMAKERS......Page 33
2.12. TRUTHS WITHOUT MINIMAL TRUTHMAKERS......Page 35
2.13. UNIQUE MINIMAL TRUTHMAKERS......Page 36
2.14. THE POSTULATION OF TRUTHMAKERS CONTRASTED WITH ‘QUANTIFYING OVER’......Page 37
2.15. DIFFERENT TRUTHS, SAME MINIMAL TRUTHMAKERS......Page 38
3.2. MOOREAN TRUTHS......Page 40
3.3. THE RATIONAL SCIENCES......Page 44
3.5. DEFIATIONARY TRUTHMAKERS......Page 46
3.6. GOING BEYOND THE RATIONAL CONSENSUS......Page 48
3.7. TRUTHMAKERS THAT ARE TOO NARROW OR TOO WIDE......Page 50
3.8. METAPHYSICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY......Page 51
4.2. PROPERTIES......Page 53
4.2.1. Different conceptions of properties......Page 56
4.2.2. A difficulty for trope theories?......Page 57
4.2.3. How do properties stand to the particulars that have them?......Page 58
4.3. PREDICATION NECESSARY OR CONTINGENT?......Page 59
4.4. UNIVERSALS AND INSTANTIATION......Page 60
4.5. STATES OF AFFAIRS......Page 62
4.6. RELATIONS......Page 64
5.1. INTRODUCTION......Page 67
5.2. CAN WE DISPENSE WITH NEGATIVE FACTS?......Page 68
5.2.1. The Incompatibility solution......Page 74
5.2.2. Preventions, omissions and the Deadly Void......Page 77
5.2.3. Preventions and omissions supervene......Page 80
5.2.4. Perception of absence......Page 81
6.1. TRUTHMAKERS FOR GENERAL TRUTHS......Page 82
6.2. THE LOGICAL FORM OF GENERAL FACTS......Page 86
6.2.1. Minimal truthmakers for general and negative truths......Page 89
6.3. TOTALITY STATES OF AFFAIRS AND THE CAUSAL ORDER......Page 90
6.3.1. Cox’s objection......Page 92
6.4. WHY DID RUSSELL WANT BOTH GENERAL FACTS AND NEGATIVE FACTS?......Page 93
6.5. NEW THINKING ABOUT GENERAL FACTS......Page 94
6.6. IN MEMORIAM: GEORGE MOLNAR......Page 95
7.2. THE POSSIBILITY PRINCIPLE......Page 97
7.3. THE POSSIBILITY OF ALIENS......Page 100
7.4. IS IT POSSIBLE FOR THERE TO BE NOTHING AT ALL?......Page 103
7.5. MINIMAL TRUTHMAKERS FOR TRUTHS OF POSSIBILITY......Page 105
8.1. AGAINST EXTENSIONAL ACCOUNTS OF NECESSITY......Page 109
8.2. NECESSARY STATES OF AFFAIRS IN THE RATIONAL SCIENCES?......Page 110
8.3. INTERPOLATION: TRUTHMAKERS FOR 7, 5, 12 ETC.......Page 113
8.4. TRUTHMAKERS FOR TRUTHS OF NECESSITY IN THE RATIONAL SCIENCES......Page 114
8.5. A DEEPER HYPOTHESIS......Page 117
8.6. HOCHBERG ON IDENTITY AND DIVERSITY......Page 118
8.7. INTERNAL PROPERTIES......Page 119
8.8. TRUTHS OF IMPOSSIBILITY......Page 121
8.9. ANALYTIC AND CONCEPTUAL NECESSITIES......Page 123
8.10. SUMMING UP......Page 125
9.2. TRUTHMAKERS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF NUMBERS......Page 126
9.3. A PROBLEM FOR THIS ACCOUNT......Page 130
9.4. MANY-MEMBERED CLASSES......Page 132
9.5. SINGLETONS......Page 134
9.6. THE ACCOUNT OF SINGLETONS REFINED......Page 136
9.7. A DIFFICULTY FOR POSSIBILISM......Page 138
10.1. TRUTHMAKERS FOR CAUSAL TRUTHS......Page 139
10.2. CAUSAL LAWS......Page 140
10.2.1. Powers to the rescue?......Page 145
10.2.2. Contingent connections between universals to the rescue?......Page 147
10.2.3. Necessary connections between universals to the rescue?......Page 150
10.3. DISPOSITIONS......Page 151
10.4. AGAINST POWER THEORIES OF PROPERTIES......Page 152
10.5. THE ATTRACTION OF POWER THEORIES EXPLAINED AWAY......Page 156
10.6. WHAT SORT OF TERMS DOES THE CAUSAL RELATION TAKE?......Page 157
11 Time......Page 159
References......Page 165
Index......Page 169